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ADMINISTRATIVE TRIAL EXAMINERS:
THE ANONYMOUS "MASTERS"
IVAN C. RUTLEDGE*

When an issue of fact is tried to a jury, there is a solemn procedure
for determining who made the decision. If the clerk polls the jury he
intones first, "Is this your verdict?" then, "Is this the verdict of the
jury?" There is no question as to who made the decision, because each
juror in turn accepts or rejects responsibility for it.' When a case is
referred, the parties are afforded an opportunity to know what the
recommendations of the referee are, by the filing of his report for the
clerk.' Likewise, the court as trier of the facts is required to give its
decisions in writing and file them with the clerk.'
Perhaps the first leading case to interrupt the tradition that the trier
of the facts must be identified and accessible, so that evidence and
argument may be addressed directly to him is Local Government Board
v. Arlidge,4 decided by the British House of Lords in 1914. In that
case someone in the government decided to close a dwelling on the
ground that it was unfit for human habitation (unsanitary). The lessee,
Arlidge, knew that an inspector had held a public inquiry, and had
made a report, but he was never permitted to see it. The final appellate
body sanctioned the procedure. In support of its conclusions these considerations were adduced: Parliament may, by saying so, affect "property and the liberty of a man to do what he chooses with what is his
own" and the question is only as to what Parliament has said. In construing the statute it is necessary to consider the nature of the tribunal,
whether it is "administrative and not in the ordinary sense judicial."
The Minister at the head of the Board is so busy that he cannot be
expected to discharge all his duties personally. All that is required is
that the work be done in good faith, listening fairly to both sides, and
in accordance with the usual practice. (Viscount Haldane). The seal of
the Board enjoys a presumption of regularity and its members are "sev* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 RCW 4.44.390.
2 RCW 4.48.080. In federal practice the clerk is required to notify the parties of the

filing. FED. R. Cry. P. 53 (e) (1).
5 RCW 4.44.050; General Rules of the Superior Courts 17 and 15, which require
notice of submission of findings of fact, and which render a judgment entered without
findings of fact in non-jury cases subject to a motion to vacate. See also FED. R. Civ.
P. 52.
4 [1915] A.C. 120.
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eral men of eminence." The judiciary must recognize that the Executive
operates under ministerial responsibility in Parliament, and the decisions of the Board need never be based on an actual meeting of its
members. Disclosure of internal staff deliberations would impair the
morale of the inspectors, secretaries, assistants, and consultants.
"Natural justice" is whatever the statute prescribes, or else it is a
vacuous phrase. (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline). The required procedure
was fair and was followed, even though the respondent did not get to
see the report, inasmuch as he had a full opportunity to present his case,
and the evidence was fully considered, as appears from the affidavit of
the Permanent Secretary of the Board. (Lord Parmoor). The phrase
"contrary to natural justice" is meaningless in connection with this
case. If the procedure prescribed by the statute were not fair, the conclusion could only be that the judge disapproved of the legislation,
which is irrelevant. It would be "decidedly mischievous" to make it a
practice to publish the reports of inspectors. (Lord Moulton).
Thus Arlidge failed in his objections that the procedure did not give
him an opportunity to rebut the contents of the report if they should
turn out to be adverse to him, and that he never did get to know what
officer finally decided against him on the facts.
This case was distinguished in Morganv. United States' (hereinafter
identified as Morgan I). The court tersely said that "it relates to a
different sort of administrative action and is not deemed to-be pertinent
to a proceeding under the statute before us and to the hearing which
is required by the principles established by our decisions."' The holding
was that the plaintiff was entitled to allege: that the Secretary of
Agriculture had not personally considered the evidence adduced at the
hearing on the order, although he signed the order. The court said that
the "full hearing" required by the statute has reference to the tradition
of judicial proceedings, and means that if the one who determines the
5298 U.S. 468 (1936).
OId. at 482. The difference between the administrative actions is that in the British
case, although ministerial responsibility exists as a safeguard against oppressive execu-tive action, the private rights involved were those of ownership of land, whereas in
Morgan I the action was a type of rate-making under standards set by Congress. The
court said that the order was "legislative" and gave to the proceeding "its distinctive
character" and hence not one of "ordinary administration." Id. at 479. Would "ordinary
administration" that forfeits rights in land call for a less judicialized procedure than
rate-making? The difference is more readily explicable on the other two elements of
distinction suggested by the court: the statute required the Secretary of Agriculture
to hold a "full hearing" instead of the "public local inquiry" required of the Board;
and the "principles established by our decisions" reflect a separation of powers in
which ministerial responsibility seems sometimes to be mainly characterized by avoiding the attention of Congressional investigators, and in which due process is a limitation on legislative power, enforced by judicial review.
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facts supporting the order did not consider evidence or argument, the
hearing has not been given. The vigor of the maxim that he who decides
must hear was weakened in subsequent phases of this litigation. Finally,
in Morgan IV, the court said that the trial court should never have
indulged plaintiff's scrutiny into the mental processes of the Secretary.7
Subsequent federal legislation has dealt with the problem. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act lays extensive restrictions
upon the process of delegating to trial examiners the conduct of hearings.8 The general subject covered by them is administrative decision
required by statute to be made after hearing and on the basis of the
evidence in the record. The agency may itself have "presided at the
reception of the evidence," or it may have delegated the conduct of the
hearing to officers who have the statutory qualifications. (Morgan I
did not consider the question of delegation as such, because, as the
opinion pointed out, the case was not one where the Secretary of Agriculture had authorized a subordinate to hold the hearing and make the
decision.) If, except in making rules or determining applications for
initial licenses, the agency does not itself hold the hearing it must also
delegate to the hearing officer a share in the decision-making process.'
In this sense, the maxim is converted to: "He who hears must decide,"
at least in part. The hearing officer may make an "initial" decision,
which becomes the decision of the agency in the absence of agency
review. The alternative is that the one who conducts the hearing must
make a recommendation or "intermediate report" to the agency. This
goes along with the entire record to the agency, thus giving it the
benefit of his evaluation of demeanor evidence or at least providing the
parties to the hearing with indirect access to the ultimate trier of the
facts.
Furthermore, the Act provides the parties with constant participation
in the decision-making process. They are entitled to propose findings
and to make exceptions, objections, and arguments against findings
made or recommended by the hearing officer.' The agency itself is
7 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). The trial court through all four
phases was never able to get the holding of the Supreme Court straight, according to
the Supreme Court. See GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1116-1145 (1954)
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

331-336 (1951).

237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1952). Sections 5 (c), 7 and 8, 60
STAT. 240-242, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1006 (c), 1008 and 1009, are pertinent here.
9 Id.,§ 1009 (a). In the excepted instances the agency may in an emergency dispense
with delegation of any decision-making or it may take recommendations from any
responsible officers of the agency whether or not they conducted the hearing.
'ld., § 1009 (b).
860
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bound to permit exceptions, arguments, and proposals of findings
against its "tentative" decisions."
Hence the Administrative Procedure Act tolerates the division of
hearing and deciding only on condition that the parties are advised of
the process of decision and are enabled to participate in it. The greatest
scope permitted the "institutional decision"' 2 is in rule making or
determining initial licenses, where the agency can have one officer take
the evidence, and any number of anonymous administrative "masters"
analyze, consult, and evaluate. That is, the agency can have one officer
take the evidence and others submit reports on it with or without a
report from the hearing officer. Morgan I, like the House of Lords,
recognized the pressure of business in an administrative agency, and
conceded that the evidence taken before an examiner could be "sifted
and analyzed by competent subordinates."' 3 Morgan II, however was
needed, to instruct the trial court that there was a qualification in that
case; if the subordinate analyzes, his analysis must be disclosed to the
party. 4 The Administrative Procedure Act brings clarity to the requirements in the cases upon which it imposes the initial or recommended
decision procedure. In those cases the party can in a sense sit down in
the back room with the decision makers.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, in Section 10, also
contains provisions that afford an opportunity to propose findings and
cite portions of the record to the agency, in cases where the agency did
not hear or read the evidence, before the final decision is made. There
is, however, no requirement of an intermediate report, or any nonpartisan vehicle for conveying extra-record information about the hearing to the agency.
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, better known as the
Taft-Hartley Act,"5 also dealt with this problem, in two ways. First, it
specified that if a hearing officer conducts the hearing his recommended
order, like the "initial decision" under the Administrative Procedure
11 A "tentative" decision is a preliminary one made by the agency after the trial
examiner has held the hearing. It is permitted, in making rules or initially licensing,
in lieu of a recommended or initial decision from the hearing officer.
See DAvis, ADmIsTPRATmVE LAW c. 8 (entitled "Institutional Decisions")

(1951).

'3298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
14 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1937). The court referred to Morgan I
as follows: "The Government adverts to an observation in our former opinion that,
while it was good practice-which we approved-to have the examiner, receiving the
evidence in such a case, prepare a report as a basis for exceptions and argument, we
could not say that that particular type of procedure was essential to the validity of
the proceeding." Id. at 21.
1561 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et. seq. (1952).
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Act, becomes final unless exceptions are taken to it.' Second, it abolished any section of transcript-reviewers or opinion-writers, and substituted assistants to individual members of the Board, in the manner
of law clerks."
A number of administrative agencies in the State of Washington have
contributed information concerning their practice in connection with
trial examiners. The purpose of this paper is to report the information
so contributed. The report is subject to two limitations. One is that the
information is about two years old, and the other is that the pledge of
confidence under which it was obtained requires that it be presented
in the form of statistical summary. The responses of fifteen agencies
are combined with communications from members of the Committee
on Administrative Law of the Washington State Bar Association and
members of the staff of the Attorney-General."
Four of the agencies are not required to conduct hearings, and three
of them make their decisions without hearings, either because the
decisions are quasi-legislative and are appropriately arrived at by consultation without hearing, or because the decisions are quasi-judicial
only in the sense that they apply to specific persons. In the Departments
of Fisheries and Game the decisions have the former characteristic.
The latter is the case in the Division of Banking, where the dispositions
are based upon investigative processes without adjudication, which
must be obtained by application to the judiciary. 9 The "hearings" of
the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles are likewise investigative rather
than in the nature of adjudication. The prisoner has no legally protected interest to vindicate by adjudication, so long as the Board is
16Id. § 160 (c).
§ 154 (a).
The chairman of the Administrative Law Committee, E. K. Murray, Esq., of
Tacoma, was especially helpful. For example, he rounded up and redirected an inquiry
that had gone astray, after one of the departments had forwarded the inquiry to the
State Bar Association, with a disclaimer of information about its own procedure!
This department, and all other agencies from whom information was sought, except
one, were very cooperative and helpful.
19 One of the statutes administered by the Division, the small-loan act, RCW 31.08,
has had a tortuous career in the courts. First it was held a constitutional regulation
of a business regarded by the court as legitimate, although the act imposes rigid control
over access to such enterprise, partially on the ground that the applicant for a license
would get a de novo determination in court if he was denied a license. Kelleher v.
Minshull, 11 Wn.2d 380, 119 P.2d 302 (1941). Then the court deleted the de novo
provision as unconstitutional and thereby apparently abolished any right to a hearing
on the facts. Household Finance Co. v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952) ; and
see 28 WAsH. L. REv. 146 (1953).
17Id.
1s
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acting within its discretion under a valid sentence. 0 These four
agencies represent functions that involve no adjudication in the sense
that a trial hearing is involved. In this respect they fall into three types
of functions: old-line executive functions of investigation with or without prosecution, as in the Game Department; dispositions that involve
private interests that are not entitled to protection by adjudication, as
in the case of prisoners, or that are subject to judicial correction, as in
the case of bank licensing; and quasi-legislative decisions."
Of the remaining eleven agencies, one delegates completely to a
subordinate officer the making of the decisions as well as the conduct
of the hearings. Four other agencies-hold their own hearings. As to
these five, then, there is no serious problem of the anonymity of
the trier of the facts. Three agencies uniformly delegate the hearing
function to a subordinate while reserving to themselves some measure
of decision-making power; the remaining three also do so in some cases
although in others they hear the cases. These six agencies, then, provide
the primary subject of this study.
One of them is barely within the scope of the study, however, in that,
as in the instance above, the decision of the examiner is the decision of
the agency. The difference is that here the decision of the examiner may
be reviewed by the agency, either on exceptions or on motion of the
agency, as in the case of the "initial" decision under the Administrative
Procedure Act. In such a case the agency considers the entire record
taken before the examiner and has the benefit of the examiner's decision, which is known to the private party or parties.
In the other five agencies the procedure is for the trial examiner to
conduct the hearing and prepare the order, which has the form of a
tentative draft. The agency may then adopt it or change it. Thus it
resembles the "recommended" decision of the Administrative Procedure
Act. It differs, however, in that it is an intra-office memorandum, like
the inspector's report in Arlidge; no private party is entitled to see it.
20 Scott v. Callahan, 39 Wn2d 801, 239 P.2d 333 (1951); Pierce v. Smith, 31
Wn.2d.52, 195 P'.2d 112 (1948). It should be distinctly understood that the paragraph to
which this note is appended, as its tenor indicates, does not necessarily reflect the
opinion of any state officer and is unconnected with the reports made in the course of
the survey.
21 See Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac. 595 (1920), which
holds that a statute delegating legislative power may be valid although it does not
require the agency to employ adjudication in making its rules. Even where a trial
hearing is not required by constitution or statute, it has been found desirable for some
functions, either in the interests of obtaining evidence in an orderly way, or because
of the favorable impact on the regulated party in obtaining his acceptance of the
regulatory program, or for other reasons. Some of the agencies in this study hold
hearings though not required to do so.
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However, at least two of these agencies are by law required to give
personal consideration to the entire record. These two agencies, and
two others, report that all of the members of the agency do in all cases
read the record. ' 2 Some of the reports make it clear that what actually
happens is that routine cases are instances of rubber-stamping the
decision of the trial examiner, because the efficiency of the agency
would suffer unnecessarily if its members spent their time reading the
entire record in every case. When the agency does consider the entire
record, the principle that he who decides must hear is in large measure
satisfied. What the agency lacks then is extra-record information about
the hearing such as demeanor evidence. A lawyer who has witnesses
who make a poor appearance on the stand but talk well would find it
difficult to object to this divided mode of trial. It could be called trial
by deposition, in the manner of ancient equity practice, for it is the
function of the trial examiner to be a deposition-taker.
The existence of a tentative draft or "intermediate report" modifies
the foregoing picture somewhat. It is at once the source of a limited
amount of information about what went on at the hearing, though not
the equivalent of being at the hearing, and at the same time it is the
source of some independently conceived views about what the conclusion ought to be. Insofar as this report is not made available to the
parties, although they know who the trial examiner is, they do not
know what part he plays in the decision-making process. None of these
five agencies, and none of the other four who conduct their own hearings
confessed to automatic acceptance of a staff member's views. On the
other hand, all reported the use of advice, not only from the hearing
officer, but in some instances from a member of the agency particularly
assigned to study the case or from an assistant attorney general detailed
to assist the agency, and in all nine agencies generally the help of the
staff collectively was reported. Of course, it would be silly to point to
22 What seems to be indicated for this segment of agency workload is a delegation,
by agency rule in order to inform the public, of the authority to make an "initial"
decision. If it is impossible to describe the class of routine cases in advance, or if it
is desirable for moral effect to have the signatures of agency members on the order,
the rule could provide in substance somewhat as follows: "In all cases set for hearing
before a designated hearing officer under this rule, the findings, conclusions, and order
of such officer will be approved by the board not less than twenty days after notice
thereof to all parties to the hearing, unless the board shall have granted a reconsideration, either on exceptions to such order or on its own motion. If such reconsideration
is granted, the board will consider the entire record or such parts thereof as are
cited by an excepting party, and may set the matter down for oral argument." Statutes
requiring personal consideration by the members of the agency would not, of course,
authorize such delegations. However, it may be a better solution to recognize workload
limitations in this way than merely to wink at statutory violations or to trust that they
will be hard to prove.
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the analogy of the jury room, where the bailiff is officially tongue-tied
except under instructions from the judge. Moreover, law clerks to
judges have their proper role,2" and in the variety of decision-making
vested in administrative agencies, there are many situations where
many heads are better than one, just as legislation or business administration. Nevtrtheless, when a "judicialized" approach is appropriate
and the private party has a reasonable expectation of knowing who his
judge is and what the case adverse to him is, some safeguards are
indicated.2 4
It is not the purpose of this study to propose reforms, or even to suggest that reforms in Washington administrative practice are needed."
No direct evidence has been found that among the agencies cooperating
23

Compare

CANON OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

17, "Ex Parte Communications"; and see

Judge Jerome Frank, dissenting in La Touraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co.,
157 F.2d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 1946) cert. denied, 329 U.S. 771 (1946) : "Seeking casually
for a reference as to the meaning to Americans of Touraine, I find, on the bookshelf
of a furnished house I am renting for the summer, a textbook ... written by Miss
Roth, an American high-school teacher, published . . . for instruction in French in
American public high-schools." In the kind of sociological inquiry that may arise under
the standard for testing the existence of confusion in trade name case, "litigation"
evidence may not be as enlightening as knowledge derived from surveys, or "opinion
polls" as they are sometimes called. Whether Miss Roth had knowledge of such
quality about the usage of "Touraine" may be doubted, but the candor of the judge
evokes a comparison with a provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, applicable
in federal administrative adjudication: 'Where any agency decision rests on official
notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, any party shall
on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary." 60 STAT. 242
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008 (d) (1952). Compare however the provisions exempting from
the formal adjudication requirements "proceedings in which the decisions rest solely
on inspections, tests, or elections," and the provision giving a licensee the right to an
opportunity to "demonstrate" compliance with the law. Id. §§ 1006, 1010 (b).
24 "But what would be essential to the adequacy of the hearing if the Secretary
himself makes the findings is not a criterion for a case in which the Secretary accepts
and makes as his own the findings which have been prepared by the active prosecutors
for the Government, after an ex parte discussion with them and without according any
reasonable opportunity to the respondents in the proceeding to knov the claims thus
presented and to contest them. That is more than an irregularity in practice; it is a
vital defect." Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1937). The
prescription for notice of the intermediate report, opportunity to take exceptions and
to propose findings and conclusions, contained in this opinion, is lifted almost verbatim
into the Administrative Procedure Act. 60 STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
The Act also prohibits ex parte communications from any officers having prosecuting
or investigative functions and prohibits, unless authorized by law, any ex parte communication by the hearing officer with any person concerning any fact in issue. These
provisions outlawing the so-called institutional decision, are very narrowly applicable,
however. They do not apply to hearings for the purpose of making rules, nor to
adjudications of a wide variety, including for example those subject to re-trial in
court and those dealing with the application of public utility rates. 60 STAT. 240 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1006 (c) (1952).
25 The author has suggested elsewhere that the people of the state are left in the
dark as to the law made by administrative agencies and their procedure. 28 WASH.
L. REv. 193-194 (1953). The first order of reform would be to provide for a systematic,
periodical publication of administrative rules and regulations. Then it should be
possible to determine, in part at least, without the necessity of individual correspondence,
whether there are problems that need to be dealt with and the extent to which uniformity of procedure is feasible.
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in the inquiry their "clients" have been aggrieved by any feeling of
mystery as to how the decision was deliberated within the agency. It
is reasonable to conclude that these agencies are, within the limitations
of their appropriations and personnel, according fair procedure in
administrative adjudication as a general rule.
Perhaps it is pertinent to raise a few issues of general import. How
far is administrative adjudication procedure necessary or advisable?
If done right, it is more time-consuming, cumbersome, and expensive
than the decision-making procedures of a czar, or even of a board of
directors, or a general manager. On the other hand a "day in court,"
even if before an administrative tribunal, is a precious heritage and an
intricately-evolved legal institution for the resolution of important
issues of a particular kind. Assuming that there are compelling reasons
for transferring adjudication from the courts to administrative agencies,
what reasons could there be for providing a complete re-trial in court
in addition to an administrative trial hearing? Assuming, further, that
adjudication has been vested in an administrative agency, what considerations indicate a relaxation of judicial norms, such as that he who
decides must hear? The use of trial examiners in administrative adjudication is typical. 6 The result is a two-level (or more) quasi-judiciary
within each agency employing trial examiners, except that the transfer
of the case from the trial to the appellate level may not be as well
marked as are such transfers in the judiciary, by the requirement, for
example, of a final order in the trial court. (On the other hand administrative appeals may be even more characterized by formality than
judicial appeals. The Administrative Procedure Act tends in that direction.) When trial examiners are used, but the statute prescribes that
the evidence shall have the personal consideration of the agency, the
most efficient use of the examiners will militate against strict obedience
to the statute, and the presumption of official regularity may have to
work overtime. If this kind of official habit develops, legal morality
suggests that the statute should be overhauled so as to permit the
agency to do its work and at the same time accord a fair hearing. Furthermore, there are subject-matter areas where the advice of staff consultants, both in government and outside, should enter into an intelligent
decision. The analogy of a medical clinic has been suggested, where
specialization provides a maximum scope of effectiveness for the apti26

See Rhyne, "Can You Try An Administrative Agency Case as You Do a Case

In Court?" 40 A.B.A.J. 751 (1954).
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tudes of each staff member..2 7 The objective here is to keep responsibility
fixed on an identified "line" officer who makes the decision, while
affording appropriate opportunity to meet such opinions of the expert
as are presented to the trier of the facts. The vesting of adjudication in
administrative agencies should provide the occasion for devising more
flexible procedural methods, but not the pretext for diluting the fairness
of a trial hearing.

27 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW

355 (1951).

